The Iran crisis is far from over – instead we are entering a new and uncertain phase | Sanam Vakil

4 hours ago 3

The ceasefire announcement between the US and Iran has been met with understandable relief. Talks are now set to take place in Islamabad on Friday, offering a chance to step back from the immediate danger of a wider war. This moment should not be mistaken for a resolution, but understood as a pause – an opportunity to test pathways towards a difficult but necessary political settlement.

Despite claims of success from all sides, the reality is that no party was winning the war. President Donald Trump has framed the conflict as both a military victory and a step towards regime change in Iran. Yet the war was ill-conceived, built on the assumption that it would be quick and decisive. Instead it proved far more costly and damaging to US credibility. It did not produce regime change. Rather, it led to the promotion and consolidation of new, untested harder-line leadership at the head of the same political system. The structure of the Islamic Republic remains intact, demonstrating its capacity to absorb shock and consolidate its authority.

However, it would be equally misleading to suggest that Iran has emerged as a winner. The country and its military capabilities have been significantly damaged, but in Tehran degradation does not translate into defeat. Iran retains operational capacity and continues to pose threats across multiple domains. Its leverage over the strait of Hormuz, along with its missile and drone capabilities, ensures that it remains capable of inflicting damage and shaping events beyond its borders. But these gains have come at a cost: Tehran will now face monumental political and economic challenges from its traumatised population, and contend with anger from its neighbours, isolating it within the region.

Across the region, the effects were immediate and far reaching. Gulf states were exposed both economically and strategically, bearing the daily barrage of Iranian missiles and drones. Israel faced the prospect of escalation across multiple fronts. Lebanon and Iraq remained vulnerable to spillover. This was not a contained conflict but an interconnected regional war.

Without a ceasefire, Washington was facing increasingly dangerous escalation choices. Options included targeting Kharg Island or launching operations to reopen the strait of Hormuz. It also faced the possibility of acting on Trump’s threat to target civilian infrastructure – a move that would constitute a war crime. Each of these paths carried significant political and strategic costs, including dragging the US into a longer conflict. Tehran saw an opportunity to try to translate its gains into a permanent resolution of tensions with Washington.

It is this convergence of costs that helps explain why a ceasefire has emerged at this moment. But it also underscores how difficult it will be to turn this pause into a lasting agreement. The most contentious issues will now be addressed in Islamabad. At the centre of the negotiations lies a question of trust as much as substance: whether the US can offer credible assurances against renewed strikes and whether Iran is prepared to accept limits on its ability to threaten shipping in the strait of Hormuz. Sanctions relief will be equally central, as any agreement must make de-escalation politically viable on both sides. External actors, including China as well as Europe and the UK, are likely to be needed as guarantors.

Iran’s nuclear programme will remain a core issue in these negotiations. Building on talks held six weeks ago in Geneva, Tehran will need to show a willingness to compromise – whether through downblending enriched uranium, which makes it less suitable to be used in weapons, or allowing international inspectors back into the country. At the same time, it will demand that Washington recognise its right to enrichment. The extent to which the US is prepared to link meaningful sanctions-relief to these steps will be critical in determining whether any agreement can hold and be defended domestically.

Just as importantly, the wider regional dimension risks being sidelined. Iran has pushed for the ceasefire to extend to Lebanon, viewing it as part of the same confrontation. Israel, however, has made clear that its campaign against Hezbollah is not covered by the truce and has continued operations. Gulf states are seeking assurances that they will not remain exposed to repeated pressure on their infrastructure and shipping routes. They have called for compensation of their own and have legitimate demands that their security be guaranteed. Israel, meanwhile, remains deeply sceptical of any arrangement that leaves Iran’s missile, nuclear and regional military capabilities intact. If the talks in Islamabad focus too narrowly on US-Iranian priorities, they may stabilise the immediate crisis while leaving the broader regional order vulnerable to renewed disruption.

With US forces still building up in the region and the risk of renewed escalation hovering over the talks, there remains a real possibility that the ceasefire will collapse. This could take the form of new threats, further pressure on the strait of Hormuz, incremental strikes or the extension of negotiations beyond their initial timeframe.

The ceasefire should be understood not as the end of the crisis but as the start of a new and uncertain phase. What emerges from Islamabad may still fall short of a durable peace, but the alternative – a return to escalation – is far worse. The window is narrow, and what matters now is whether the parties are willing to keep it open.